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ABSTRACT 
 This paper argues that the early American republic is best understood as a constitutional 
experiment in “settler empire,” and that related migration policies played a central role in 
shaping collective identity and structures of authority. Initial colonists, along with their 19th 
century descendants, viewed society as grounded in an ideal of freedom that emphasized 
continuous popular mobilization and direct economic and political decision-making. However, 
many settlers believed that this ideal required Indian dispossession and the coercive use of 
dependent groups, most prominently slaves, in order to ensure that they themselves had access to 
property and did not have to engage in menial but essential forms of work. Crucially, settlers 
recognized that in order to sustain such a project of republican freedom and territorial conquest, 
they would need new migrants beyond the flow of English colonists. This promoted strong 
commitments to open immigration – but only from ethnically appropriate communities – as a 
central engine of settler development and expansion. Thus, although we often think of 
immigration and settlerism as competing national identities, I contend that for centuries the idea 
of the United States as a European immigrant nation – as well as the constitutional structures 
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I. Introduction: Immigration and American Exceptionalism  
American identity has long been linked to the idea of the United States as a nation of 
immigrants—a place uniquely hospitable to individuals seeking new economic opportunities or 
political possibilities. As French American farmer J. Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur wrote in 
1793 in answer to the question, “What then is the American, this new man?”:  
He is an American, who, leaving behind him all his ancient prejudices and 
manners, receives new ones from the new mode of life he has embraced, the new 
government he obeys, and the new rank he holds. He becomes an American by 
being received in the broad lap of our great Alma Mater. Here individuals of all 
nations are melted into a new race of men, whose labours and posterity will one 
day cause great changes in the world.1 
 
Crèvecoeur’s words underscore how for centuries this immigrant identity has been viewed by 
domestic commentators as a foundational element of American exceptionalism, distinguishing 
the U.S. culturally and institutionally from its Old World precedents and rivals. In contrast to 
America’s relative openness, European monarchies and their successor regimes created 
systematic hierarchies between sovereign subjects and foreign aliens—for instance, by denying 
the benefits of inheritance and land ownership to non-subjects. According Edward Coke, famed 
seventeenth century English jurist, such restrictions were necessary to protect the king’s control 
over the realm and to ensure that foreign subjects (and with them a foreign sovereign) did not 
claim the wealth and power from the territory. Coke declared aliens to be like a “Trojan horse” 
who would “fortify themselves in the heart of the realm, and be ready to set fire on the 
commonwealth.”2  
Yet if American identity remains bound to Crevecoeur’s vision of immigrant 
inclusiveness, today’s immigrants appear to face treatment far more in line with what Coke 
might have recommended. As one recent but telling illustration, in 1996 Congress passed 
legislation that dramatically restricted the basic rights of noncitizens. In the words of historian 
Mae Ngai, “The 1996 laws terminated welfare benefits for legal aliens, made removal mandatory 
for a broad range of offenses, and further curtailed judicial review and virtually eliminated 
administrative discretion in deportation cases.” The ultimate consequence has been to blur the 
boundary between legal and illegal immigrants, by creating new means for revoking legal status 
for long-term residents while further undermining the ability of undocumented workers to ever 
                                                 
1 J. Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur, Letters from an American Farmer (Philadelphia: Matthew Carey, 1793), 46-47. 
2 Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 399 (1608). 
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‘legalize’ their position.3 At present, even permanent residents live in the United States on “a 
condition of permanent probation,” since minor offenses can carry mandatory deportation 
irrespective of whether immigrants have served their sentences or have long-standing ties to the 
United States—including a history of military service.4 
 At the same time, the United States has pursued these policies by bringing the full force 
of the American penal system to bear on noncitizens. In the wake of the attacks of September 11, 
2001, immigration laws were employed to contain the perceived threat posed by Arab and 
Muslim extremists, leading to the arrest and detention of some 5,000 immigrants.5 And as a more 
general matter, migrants seeking asylum or individuals contesting deportation are today routinely 
held in an elaborate network of deportation centers and county jails, in the latter case alongside 
criminal offenders. Highlighting the extent of the state’s coercive enforcement, in fiscal year 
2007 the Department of Homeland Security reports that it detained 311,213 immigrants in total, 
for reasons that included minor violations or even administrative mistakes.6 
 How can we make sense of this gulf between national identity and contemporary practice 
and what does it suggest about the dramatic transformations over the course of American history 
in the role of immigrants in collective life? In the following pages I will explore the genesis and 
implications of today’s approach toward noncitizens by excavating a past paradigm that on first 
glance might seem remote and unrelated: namely the historical project of continental settlement. 
From the earliest period of colonization until the beginning of the twentieth century the U.S. was 
a constitutional experiment in settler colonialism.7 Initial colonists, along with their nineteenth 
century descendents, viewed society as grounded in an ideal of freedom that emphasized 
continuous popular mobilization and direct economic and political decision-making. However, 
                                                 
3 See Mae Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), 265–270 (quotation on 268). 
4 Quotation in ibid., 269. For more on the effects of mandatory deportation, see “Group Reports That 1996 
Immigration Law Separated 1.6 Million from Families,” Associated Press, July 18, 2007, 
www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,289734,00.html; and Serena Hoy, “The Other Detainees,” Legal Affairs, 
September/October 2004, www.legalaffairs.org. Offenses for which immigrants have been deported include “writing 
bad checks, selling $10 worth of marijuana, or pulling someone’s hair during a fight at a party.” Hoy, “Other 
Detainees.” 
5 See David Cole, “Are We Safer?” New York Review of Books, March 9, 2006, www.nybooks.com. 
6 On the use of the penal system, see generally Mark Dow, American Gulag: Inside U.S. Immigration Prisons 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004). For statistics on immigrant detainees, see Nina Bernstein and Julia 
Preston, “Better Health Care Sought for Detained Immigrants,” New York Times, May 7, 2008, www.nytimes.com. 
7 For a comprehensive account of the role of settler constitutionalism in American life, see Aziz Rana, The Two 
Faces of American Freedom (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010). The basic descriptions of settler 
institutions draw from this work.   
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many settlers believed that this ideal required Indian dispossession and the coercive use of 
dependent groups, most prominently slaves, in order to ensure that they themselves had access to 
property and did not have to engage in menial but essential forms of work.  
Crucially, settlers recognized that in order to sustain such a project of republican freedom 
and territorial conquest, they would need new migrants beyond the flow of English colonists. But 
for these early Anglo settlers, who maintained sharp cultural distinctions between insiders and 
outsiders, migrants had to share key ethnic characteristics and thus be viewed as worthy of 
participating in settler growth and development. This need for the ‘right’ type of migrant 
promoted strong commitments to open European immigration while at the same time justified 
rigid limitations on non-white movement (such as the Chinese in the late nineteenth century). 
Thus, although we often think of immigration and settlerism as competing national identities, I 
contend that for centuries the idea of the United States as an immigrant nation—as well as the 
constitutional structures supporting that vision—was directly bound to settler needs and 
institutions. In fact, the harshness of current immigration policy has much to do both with the 
historic decline of settler frameworks and with fundamental shifts in where today’s migrants 
originate (overwhelming outside of the Global North).  
In pursuing these arguments, Part Two will begin by articulating the guiding 
constitutional structure of American settlerism and its constitutive relationship to immigration. 
Part Three then will describe the genesis of migration policies in the North American colonies, 
focusing on their distinctiveness from existing European models and how they set the basic 
rubric for the early republic. Part Four will assess how immigration in the nineteenth century 
served both as a tool of settler expansion and as a method of establishing clear ethnic—and 
increasingly racial—divisions between full citizens and dependent groups.  Finally, Part Five 
will present the steady collapse of settler constitutionalism and its implications for the status of 
noncitizens (European and non-European alike) in American life after the 1920s.  By way of a 
conclusion, I will return to the contemporary moment, exploring how current practices 
increasingly reject the inclusive and liberating elements of settler immigration policies while 






II. Early America as a Constitutional Project in Settler Colonialism 
What does it mean to describe the American constitutional past as an embodiment of 
settler colonialism? Today, while the image of the pioneer settler has become a staple of 
American popular culture, this image is largely presented as a specifically American story about 
the frontier—one that either praises the heroism of the rugged pioneer or denounces the 
expropriation and removal of indigenous peoples. However these prevailing accounts by and 
large neglect the striking continuities between the American experience and that of similar 
experiments in imperial conquest and European settlement. Like the French in Algeria, the 
English in Ireland, Australia, and South Africa, or even the Chinese in Taiwan, the United 
States’ earliest beginnings and political founding were first and foremost as a settler society. This 
settler framework generated its own ideology and practices, which established profound 
interconnections between internal liberty and external subordination. Such national origins 
embody more than a distant period of conquest and exclusion—that while reprehensible have 
little to say about current institutions. Rather, they provided the basic account of political 
sovereignty and constitutional authority for American life for over three centuries.       
Technically, settler societies are characterized by substantial and long-lasting imperial 
populations, which seek to transplant home country ways to the new environment. As Ronald 
Weitzer writes, colonies of settlement generally produce extensive political and economic 
institutions that “achieve[] de facto or de jure political independence from [the imperial] 
metropole.”8 This de facto autonomy tends to promote decentralized and less hierarchical modes 
of internal political authority. Just as important, in such communities the descendants of 
colonists also wrest political supremacy from indigenous groups; they maintain this supremacy 
permanently or for many generations and develop complex ideologies to legitimate such 
enforced inequality.9 
                                                 
8 Ronald Weitzer, Transforming Settler States: Communal Conflict and Internal Security in Northern Ireland and 
Zimbabwe (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 26. 
9 Efforts by historians and social scientists to make comparative assessments about settler institutions have often 
focused on how labor regimes influence political arrangements. For instance, D.K. Fieldhouse in the 1960s 
developed a typology to delineate various forms of settlerism, which he divides into three basic categories: mixed, 
plantation, and pure settlement. See D.K. Fieldhouse, The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey of the 
Eighteenth Century (New York: Delacorte Press, 1967), 11-12. George Fredrickson also employs this typology, 
which he views as providing ideal types, and ties settler modes of racial exclusion and control to the metropole’s 
economic goals and labor practices. See George M. Fredrickson, “Colonialism and Racism: The United States and 
South Africa in Comparative Perspective,” in The Arrogance of Race: Historical Perspectives on Slavery, Racism, 
and Social Inequality (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1988), 216-235, especially 220-221.   
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In the history of imperial expansion, there were two distinct modern periods of settler 
colonialism. The first wave included what Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen call the “new 
world colonies,” exemplified by European settlement in the United States, South Africa, 
Australia, and elsewhere.10 These colonies were typified by efforts to claim indigenous territory 
exclusively for settler communities, territory that was repeatedly described as virgin or empty.  
Moreover, the primary approach to the local population was driven less by the desire “to govern 
indigenous peoples or to enlist them in their economic ventures than to seize their land and push 
them beyond an ever-expanding frontier of settlement.”11 New World colonies consistently 
sought to weaken metropolitan authority over settler life, and to employ de facto relationships of 
autonomy to press both for full independence and for the complete removal of indigenous 
groups. 
The second wave took place during the late nineteenth and early to mid-twentieth 
centuries and included European and Japanese settlements across parts of Africa and Asia. In 
contrast to the New World colonies, these later efforts generally confronted indigenous 
populations whose size and strength on the ground left settlers as a distinct numerical minority. 
This resulted in a central difference with the earlier wave of colonization. Both settlers and 
metropolitan officials were unable simply to depopulate the territory. Rather, they engaged in 
“protracted negotiations or struggles with always more numerous indigenous populations.”12 
These realities meant that while colonists may have sought greater autonomy from their home 
countries, in the final analysis they remained politically—and especially militarily—dependent 
on metropolitan authority for their continued social supremacy and privilege. Without home 
country support, colonists faced the persistent danger of becoming small minorities in a hostile 
political community. 
                                                 
10 Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen, “Settler Colonialism: A Concept and Its Uses,” Settler Colonialism in the 
Twentieth Century, eds. Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen (New York: Routledge, 2005), 1-20 (quotation on 2). 
See also James Belich, Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Angloworld, 1783-1939 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) for a recent account of how new world settler colonies spread English 
customs and language across the globe, focusing particularly on how migration patterns and the onset of 
industrialization combined to produce booming Anglo settler economies. Another new study, Lisa Ford, Settler 
Sovereignty: Jurisdiction and Indigenous People in America and Australia, 1788-1836 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2010), offers an excellent comparative assessment of how settler-native relations operated in 
practice in both Georgia and New South Wales. 
11 Elkins and Pedersen, “Settler Colonialism,” 2. 
12 Ibid., 3. 
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In a sense, the key distinctions between twentieth century settlerism and its earlier form 
in the New World help to explain why Americans today rarely conceive of themselves as 
‘settlers.’ As Patrick Wolfe notes, the basic logic of the early settler wave was not the 
exploitation of indigenous groups but rather that of native elimination. This elimination took the 
form not merely of violence against local communities or the dissolution of indigenous political 
and economic practices. It also meant that settlers sought to replace native society as such and to 
“erect a new colonial society on the expropriated land base.”13 Thus, the vision of indigenous 
territory as empty land was part and parcel of settler efforts to transform themselves into 
‘natives’ and to escape the very category of colonialism. In keeping with this, the desire to see 
the U.S. as an exceptional nation was partially built on the need to distance the country from its 
European origins, and to assert an authentically local American character or way of life.         
 These shared settler features suggest that what makes the American experience 
distinctive must be read in light of its comparative continuities. American commentators often 
view aspects of national history to be uniquely homegrown, when in fact they are present to 
varying degrees in numerous settler societies. Among others, these qualities include greater 
equality within the settler colony than in the imperial metropole or home country; a cultural 
sense of being ‘chosen’ as a racial, ethnic, or religious community for a historical mission; a 
greater emphasis on militarism due to perceived threats from indigenous and foreign populations; 
and, finally, a wariness of metropolitan social and political customs which are depicted at times 
as corrupt or decadent. 
Nonetheless, the success of the revolt by the thirteen British colonies spawned a unique 
settler ideology. This ideology fused ethnic nationalism, Protestant theology, and republicanism 
to combine freedom as self-rule with a commitment to territorial empire. Such self-rule involved 
the elimination of all modes of arbitrary authority and required individuals to assert actual 
decision-making power over economic and political relations, through productive control and 
democratic participation. As a consequence, I argue that American settlerism was organized 
around four basic components. First, in radicalizing seventeenth century republican ideas 
increasingly prevalent in England, settlers came to view economic independence as the ethical 
basis of free citizenship. Centuries of Americans saw control over the instruments and conditions 
                                                 
13 See Patrick Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” Journal of Genocide Research 8 
(2006): 387-409 (quotation on 388). 
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of work as providing insiders with a collective experience in autonomy and moral independence. 
Primarily through land ownership and individual proprietorship, settlers sought to create an 
internally egalitarian and participatory political community. Second, Americans viewed the basic 
engine of republican freedom to be conquest. Without new territory for settlers, the ethical 
benefits of ‘free labor’ could not be made generally accessible. In other words, as a political 
necessity, settlers viewed republicanism as constitutively bound to empire and expansion.  
Third, settler society presumed that republican principles at root were not universally 
inclusive. In other words, most settlers believed that not everyone could enjoy the benefits of 
economic independence.  They argued that the nature of agricultural life meant that for some to 
engage in the dignified work marked by productive control, there would have to be others that 
participated in forms of labor long perceived to be degraded—such as tenancy, wage labor, and 
domestic service. Thus, for settlers, there existed at the heart of republican notions of economic 
independence a basic divide between free and unfree work. Over time, Americans solved this 
problem by employing subordinated external groups, particularly African slaves, to engage in the 
most oppressive modes of production. And they justified both the expropriation of native land 
and the control of dependent laboring communities through arguments about ethnic and religious 
superiority. 
Fourth, settlers recognized that continual expansion rested on a burgeoning population, 
beyond what natural demographic growth and migration from England could provide. As a 
result, they created remarkably open immigration policies for Europeans deemed co-ethnics and 
thus co-participants in the republican project. This meant that for most of the American 
experience, the U.S. border was essentially a port of entry for European immigrants who were 
quickly incorporated into the political community. This incorporation included practices that 
today would be quite surprising, such as the prevalence of noncitizen voting and noncitizen 
access to federal land out west. On the one hand, the territorial need for immigrants checked the 
most xenophobic tendencies within settler society over the course of the nineteenth century, by 
expanding the ethnic and religious categories for who could count as American. On the other 
hand, it also hardened the divide between social insiders and subordinated outsiders. Thus, while 
many new European immigrants may have had immediate access to the conditions necessary for 
free citizenship and equal political participation, Indians, blacks, or Mexicans who had long lived 
on the land were denied these basic rights. In essence, they existed as colonized populations 
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within the territory of the United States, in ways akin to twentieth century settler structures of 
indigenous control, in which “a caste division . . . [was] built into the economy, political system, 
and the law, with particular economic activities and political privileges . . . reserved for members 
of the settler population.”14 Thus, American political identity was intricately tied to imperial 
assumptions about both the need for new immigrant settlers and for external control over 
dependent communities. 
Until its steady disintegration in the first half of the twentieth century, this settler 
ideology generated a constitutional politics built on two distinct accounts of sovereign power—
one of democratic consent and internal checks and another of external discretion. In fact, 
generations of settler insiders linked the very act of an energetic federal government to the 
project of empire building, a project that presupposed an unlimited imperial authority deriving 
from British royal prerogative. Aggressive federal activity thus became synonymous with the 
internal application of a coercive authority properly applied only to those outside the bounds of 
social inclusion, such as natives, Mexicans, and blacks. Under these circumstances, any internal 
appearance of the dreaded imperial prerogative was viewed as a dangerous threat to liberty and 
an attempt to reduce settlers to the condition of heathens or savages—by treating free citizens as 
if they were colonial subjects. Particularly xenophobic, this dualist vision of political sovereignty 
upheld the necessity of empire and simultaneously remained ever vigilant about the possibility of 
imperial power seeping into settler society. It also underscored the dynamics of American social 
membership, in which ethnically-defined status as a settler was more important than being 
accorded formal citizenship. In other words, the framework of duality separated insiders—
immigrant and native-born alike—from all nonsettlers, who found themselves subject to a 
complicated and stratified structure of overlapping hierarchies.  
 
III. European Migration during the Colonial Period 
In order to illustrate how this constitutional structure emerged and operated in political 
life, let me begin by exploring migration policies during the colonial period. By the mid-
eighteenth century, the British project of decentralized imperial expansion produced a 
remarkable state of affairs in the North American colonies: land ownership by and large was 
widely dispersed and colonists enjoyed extensive political and legal rights. Even more so than 
                                                 
14 Elkins and Pederson, “Settler Colonialism,” 4. 
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the Crown intended, its settlers created uniquely self-governing polities in which—for those 
included as full members—republican liberty was a tangible experience. For instance, in the 
chartered colonies of New England, the Crown possessed virtually no direct power, as the 
governor and the executive council were both elected. Even in royal colonies like Virginia where 
these positions were Crown appointments, the colonies maintained representative legislative 
bodies with the plenary power to make colonial law so long as it coincided with imperial statutes 
and received metropolitan consent. The colonies also organized local government, with settlers 
providing the justices of peace and even establishing municipalities with powers analogous to 
English chartered boroughs. Moreover, settlers possessed the same basic rights as fellow 
Englishmen, and, in particular, trial by jury and habeas corpus were guaranteed to all Anglo 
colonists and their descendents.15 
However, the political autonomy that developed went hand in hand with deep insularity 
within settler society. Despite the religious and cultural differences between the various colonies, 
settlers in general saw their ancestry as foundational for their status as privileged subjects. They 
viewed this ancestry as grounding specific and cherished liberties, as emblazoned in the Magna 
Carta.16 For many settlers, this specific cultural history of liberty made them exceptionally suited 
for free political life. Thus, while a native could become civilized and Christian through 
sedentary agriculture and religious conversion, the absence of any link to Britain’s ancestral past 
would always make his complete inclusion impossible. The capacity for liberty, developed over 
generations, made settlers—as opposed to subjugated communities—distinctively qualified for 
political, economic, and social power. As a result, and in a manner similar to numerous other 
settler societies, political self-government in the colonies was premised on an organic notion of 
belonging that linked ancestry and land to membership. 
Yet Anglo settlers nonetheless confronted a basic predicament that cut against the most 
intense forms of insularity. For English colonies to be economically sustainable and militarily 
secure from indigenous threat—let alone to expand—they required a larger population. By the 
eighteenth century, industrialization and changes in economic production in England led 
metropolitan officials to be deeply ambivalent toward increasing Anglo emigration; these 
officials sought instead to maintain a sizeable workforce for factories on the island. Since 
                                                 
15 See Fieldhouse, The Colonial Empires, 59-63. 
16 See generally David Hackett Fischer, Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in America (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), 810–816. 
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England alone could not supply the necessary numbers, settlers promoted emigration by other 
European communities, efforts that led to a substantial non-English population by the mid-
eighteenth century. 
In order to attract these newcomers, colonists developed practices for easy naturalization, 
which were far more open and simplified than those at home. James Kettner writes that “neither 
the royal charters, nor parliamentary statutes, nor common law principles explicitly conferred 
upon colonial authorities the right to adopt aliens as subjects.”17 Nonetheless, almost 
immediately colonies aggressively asserted their local colonial authority to naturalize European 
foreigners, regardless of whether these powers were recognized in London. Settlers employed a 
variety of tools to aid quick naturalization. The most common method was the passage of special 
naturalization acts by local assemblies to incorporate new European subjects. Other means 
included the use of enrollment procedures and group naturalizations. In New York, settlers 
naturalized all resident foreigners “professing Christianity” who pledged an oath of allegiance by 
November 1, 1683.18 Under John Locke’s Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, foreigners 
simply had to appear at any precinct register, and if they pledged on a copy of the Constitutions 
that they would “bear faith and true allegiance” to the king and “to the Palatine and Lords 
Proprietors,” they would be immediately naturalized.19 
Along with creating lax naturalization policies, settlers also expanded the provision of 
rights traditionally offered naturalized European subjects. While in England the established 
policy was to exclude these subjects from holding high political office, in North America 
practices were more flexible. In Pennsylvania, a 1706 election law permitted naturalized subjects 
to vote as well as to stand for elected positions. Even more distinctively, settlers began extending 
rights to European foreigners, in ways that contradicted the classic divide between subjects and 
aliens and that broke decisively from practices in England. In 1704 the South Carolina legislature 
passed a suffrage law providing voting rights to new immigrants as long as they met residency 
and property requirements. The law simply formalized practices occurring on the ground, as 
widespread alien voting had taken place in the colony’s 1701 election, particularly by French 
Huguenots. In 1761 Georgia, too, enacted an equivalent measure allowing for alien voting. And 
                                                 
17 James Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship, 1608-1870 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1978), 78. 
18 Quoted in ibid., 86. 
19 John Locke, “The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina (1669),” in Political Writings, ed. David Wootton 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2003), 210–232, 231–232. 
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in Pennsylvania, even without such laws on the books, by the 1740s it had become commonplace 
for German Protestants to vote and hold office, with or without the benefit of naturalization.20  
Crucially, these practices were fundamentally grounded in ethnic and religious judgments 
about cultural similarity. While goals of expansion may have pressed Anglo settlers to open the 
colonies to heightened immigration, only specific foreigners were welcome. In particular, settlers 
came to view colonial inclusion as appropriate for European Protestants, whose religious 
practices made them particularly suitable for republican values and English liberties. For 
instance, groups such as the French Huguenots, who faced suppression under Louis XIV, were 
treated as co-participants in the project of settlement and found a ready welcome in the colonies. 
While Catholics or Indian tribes were depicted as culturally dissimilar and ill equipped for 
freedom, Western European Protestants were seen as having their own parallel history with free 
institutions and thus assimilable within the settler project. 
This cultural approach to who properly counted as a worthy immigrant was further 
reinforced when the English Parliament finally moved in 1740 to standardize naturalization 
procedures in the colonies. For nearly half a century, settlers had argued for the Crown to 
provide legal certainty to practices emerging on the ground. The 1740 law did so by creating an 
inexpensive and clear administrative process for incorporating new subjects. Yet, along with a 
seven-year residency provision, the bill also required foreigners to profess their Christian faith 
and to submit a certificate swearing to have taken the sacrament in a Protestant church in the 
previous three months.21 While exemptions were provided for groups such as the Quakers,22 
these rules pointedly disqualified Catholics from membership. In essence, easy naturalization for 
co-ethnic and co-religious foreigners went hand in hand with the continuing exclusion of 
outsiders deemed too culturally heterodox. 
In this way, immigration became a critical means of replenishing and sustaining settler 
commitments to land conquest and republican self-rule. This meant the development of lax 
                                                 
20 For practices in South Carolina and Pennsylvania, see Jamin Raskin, “Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The 
Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical Meaning of Alien Suffrage,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 141 
(1993): 1391–1470, 1399, 1400; and for the Georgia law, see Kettner, American Citizenship, 102. 
21 Kettner, American Citizenship, 74–75. 
22 In a real expression of toleration, Jewish emigrants also received an exemption. Ibid., 74–76. The limited size of 
the Jewish population in the colonies certainly facilitated this move. Still, despite the 1740 exemption, one should 
note that throughout the period and well into the nineteenth century Jews, as non-Christians, faced various legal 
restrictions, including on holding public office and on voting. See generally Howard M. Sachar, A History of the 
Jews in America (New York: Knopf, 1992), 9–37 (especially 17–20, 27–28).     
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naturalization rules and the extension of rights (including suffrage) to aliens in ways that differed 
dramatically from metropolitan practices. Unlike colonized or dependent groups, new Protestants 
were often viewed as worthy of full membership and therefore deserving of swift economic and 
political inclusion. Of course, these immigration policies were not applied everywhere, either 
during the colonial period or following the Revolution. In the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, Rogers Smith notes that New England tended to be “the most exclusionary” with 
Massachusetts and New Hampshire limiting freeman status to Englishmen alone.23 Still the basic 
thrust of colonial practices was strikingly distinct from that throughout Europe; such practices 
underscored the emerging centrality of immigration to settler life. They also set the stage for how 
migration policies in independent America would both facilitate settler expansion and sustain 
colonial dichotomies between insiders and outsiders. 
 
IV.  Settler Exclusivity and Expansion through the Prism of Immigration 
 One can best appreciate both sides of migration policy in the nineteenth century—as the 
engine of settler development and as a tool for maintaining an ethnically-derived account of 
membership—by juxtaposing the treatment of European and non-European communities. In 
particular, the profound disparities between the legal frameworks according white as opposed to 
Chinese migrants highlight the role of immigration in preserving settler identity and institutions.  
As the following sections explore, while Europeans often enjoyed full political and social rights 
well before formal nationality, Chinese in the second half of the century found themselves 
subject to a regime of exclusion and deportation—one at the time that was deemed appropriate 
only for ethnic outsiders.    
A. European Migration as the Engine of Settler Society 
As with the old colonial approach, following American independence European arrivals 
largely enjoyed a system of quick incorporation based on assumptions about assimilability and 
shared ethnic heritage. The United States not only maintained earlier practices of encouraging 
immigration; it extended these practices to create a remarkably inclusive community for new 
Europeans. As Hiroshi Motomura has demonstrated through his arguments about “intending 
citizenship,” immigrants, even before becoming citizens officially, were integrated into the 
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republican projects of self-rule and expansion in ways that were unimaginable on the 
Continent.24 Recall that under the European model of statecraft the legal distinction between 
aliens and subjects was of central importance. Extensive rights for aliens were believed to 
subvert the king’s dominion and allow other sovereigns to infiltrate the polity. In the United 
States, however, the European monarchical distinction between aliens and subjects became far 
less important than whether one possessed the right ethnic and cultural background to be 
incorporated into settler society. 
As a result, whether an individual was a formal citizen did not necessarily correlate with 
real social membership, or what might be termed free citizenship. Free citizens enjoyed all the 
prerequisites for republican liberty, including complete rights to land ownership and political 
participation (such as through suffrage). As the nineteenth century unfolded, a European ‘alien’ 
could often live as a free citizen in the United States even before naturalization, while dependent 
groups such as nonslave blacks may have been formally defined as citizens but were legally 
denied the basic conditions for self-rule. In essence, free citizenship was extended on the basis of 
ethnicity to co-participants in a settler project of expansion, while colonized groups—regardless 
of their legal status as ‘citizens’—were organized through long-standing modes of imperial 
authority. 
Immigrant inclusiveness was most evident in the simplicity and ease of the United States’ 
new naturalization process. Under the 1802 Naturalization Act, which remained in force for most 
of the nineteenth century, to gain formal citizenship foreigners merely had to reside in the 
country for five years, declare their intent to be naturalized at least three years before admission 
to citizenship (but at any point after residence), pledge an oath of allegiance to the federal 
Constitution, and give minimal proof of good character. Critically, this process was available 
only to ‘free white persons,’ a stipulation established by the very first naturalization law in 1790 
and which remained in effect until after the Civil War.25 But prior to formal admission, many 
immigrants who were still aliens enjoyed political and economic privileges that emphasized their 
full standing within settler society. For instance, European aliens who had declared their intent to 
become naturalized were eligible for western land grants, such as those under the 1850 Oregon 
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Donation Land Act, aimed at settling the Oregon Territory, and the more encompassing 1862 
Homestead Act.26 
Throughout the nineteenth century, European noncitizens possessed the right to vote in 
numerous states, particularly on the frontier. In the years after independence, Congress explicitly 
included European aliens as voting members in the Northwest Territories.27 Vermont’s first 
constitution provided for the naturalization and enfranchisement of aliens, and Virginia enacted 
similar policies through statute. Formalizing its colonial practices, Pennsylvania also followed 
suit, although it added a two-year residency requirement.28 These efforts ebbed in the early 
decades of the nineteenth century but quickly multiplied with a new phase of western expansion 
during the 1840s and 1850s. In 1840, the Illinois Supreme Court asserted that the state’s 
constitution provided “the right of suffrage to those who, having by habitation and residence, 
identified their interests and feelings with the citizenry . . . although they may be neither native 
nor adopted citizens.”29 In 1848, Wisconsin passed a suffrage law granting the vote to 
immigrants who under the naturalization process had declared their intent to become citizens. 
Remarkably, the right persisted regardless of whether immigrants ever actually completed the 
naturalization process. Over the next ten years, Kansas, Minnesota, Oregon, and Michigan all 
adopted similar alien suffrage laws, and after the Civil War more than a dozen additional states 
in the south and west followed the same path.30 Especially on the frontier, alien voting, which 
had first emerged during the colonial era, became routine. 
The rationale driving this openness to European immigration was the same as had long 
operated in the colonies. If the republican goals of economic independence and freedom as self-
rule necessitated territorial expansion, they also required enough people to work the land and to 
participate in projects of conquest. Again, for an ethnically defined settler society, not all 
immigrants were uniformly welcome, only those seen as culturally assimilable and thus 
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prospective co-participants in activities of settlement. But, over the long term, the driving focus 
on the needs of territorial and economic growth increasingly relaxed the idea of who counted as a 
potential free settler citizen—a fact underscored by the consistent provision of naturalization to 
all ‘free white persons.’ 
Most strikingly, these demographic and material interests meant that even Catholics came 
to be seen as capable of privileged membership, although after an appropriate period of tutelage 
in Anglo-Protestant institutions and liberty. This development was dictated in part by the simple 
facts of which communities were emigrating from Europe to the United States. Between 1846 
and 1855, over 70 percent of new arrivals to the country (2,265,018 out of 3,031,339 persons) 
were either Irish or German, a large percentage of whom were not Protestant. No doubt Catholic 
immigrants (and the Irish in particular) confronted various forms of informal and formal 
discrimination, especially at the workplace. In fact, the far greater tendency of frontier states to 
allow for alien voting was due both to their specific population needs and to the fact that the vast 
majority of immigrants out west were Germans—whom English settlers viewed as Teutons, the 
very ancestors of the Anglo-Saxons.31  
By contrast, Irish immigrants tended to congregate in already densely populated cities 
back east, where they became the focal point for Anglo fears about the cultural dissolution of 
settler society and with it republican freedom. Particularly during economic downturns, these 
fears produced backlashes against Catholic groups and generated more exclusive definitions of 
settler identity. Yet despite local electoral success, nativist parties and organizations like the 
1850s Know Nothings ultimately never succeeded in undermining existing naturalization or 
suffrage frameworks. Calls to place quotas on immigration, particularly from Catholic countries, 
or to extend the waiting period before naturalization, such as to twenty-one years, would have to 
wait for over half a century to be seriously contemplated or enacted.32 In fact, as the nineteenth 
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century wore on, the overarching need for new immigrants meant that one’s status as white 
became far more significant for free citizenship than whether immigrants were English or even 
Protestant. 
This background thus produced an extraordinary state of affairs, in which the American 
shore was more a port of entry than a closed border for Europeans coming from abroad. While 
laws existed (mostly at the state level) for the exclusion of immigrants, these were primarily due 
to public health concerns with contagious disease or to prevent paupers from landing—the latter 
as part of general measures drawn from English poor laws to restrict the movement of indigent 
persons. As a result, states established regulations, in keeping with republican concerns about the 
dependent poor, under which foreign ships were required to pay taxes for their passengers or to 
provide a bond ensuring that they would not become public charges. And some states and local 
authorities engaged in out-of-county or out-of-state removal of ‘paupers,’ immigrant or 
otherwise, who were deemed economically undesirable. But no federal deportations from the 
United States of any immigrants took place during the entire antebellum period and for the first 
two decades after the Civil War. Even at the state level, Gerald Neuman tells us that in many 
locales removal provisions were left unenforced, and where occasional enforcement took place 
during the early nineteenth century, like in New York or in Massachusetts (long a center of anti-
immigrant sentiment), the tendency over time was to replace removal with workhouses for the 
indigent. Therefore, while the myth of a legally open border may never have fully existed, for 
European immigrants the reality very nearly approximated the myth—given strong presumptions 
in favor of entry and the fact that one’s post-entry ability to remain in the United States and 
participate in its political life was by and large unquestioned.33 
Although the desire to encourage immigration west may have expanded who counted as a 
republican settler and generated a de facto open border for Europeans, it went hand in hand with 
the entrenchment of discretionary forms of authority over nonsettlers. If most European 
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immigrants, who were steadily incorporated into settler life, were free from deportation and 
enjoyed complete freedom of movement, dependent groups benefited from no similar privilege. 
Indian tribes, such as the Cherokee during the Trail of Tears, faced wholesale removal and 
expulsion. Fugitive slave laws, passed by Congress in 1793 and again in 1850, created 
administrative proceedings (with minimal judicial oversight) to forcibly return slaves to their 
owners.34 As for nonslave or free blacks, despite being formal citizens they too faced extensive 
restrictions on their movement. Slave states generally barred the admission of free blacks who 
were not already residents.35 As for newly opened land out west, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and 
Oregon prohibited altogether the entrance of the black population into their territory.36 
Under the emerging framework, newly arrived immigrants (even prior to naturalization) 
had greater privileges than communities with long histories in the United States. Not only were 
free blacks denied entrance to some frontier states; they were explicitly barred from claiming 
property through western land grants. If the frontier was considered a national reserve for the 
benefit of all social members, including noncitizen Europeans, federal law denied blacks access 
to the public domain and thus to economic independence and republican standing. In other 
words, formal citizens who had been on American soil for generations had fewer practical rights 
than alien immigrants who may have only recently arrived in the country. The treatment of 
Mexicans out west after the Mexican-American War powerfully underscored this feature of 
settler society. With the annexation of wide swaths of land through the Treaty of Guadalupe-
Hidalgo, 80,000 Mexicans now found themselves subjects of American congressional power. 
Under the treaty, those who chose to remain on their land were accorded formal status as citizens 
as well as property rights and suffrage.37 Yet, as Richard Griswold del Castillo writes, although 
Mexican proponents of the treaty assumed that the rights of these new U.S. citizens would be 
respected, “They were wrong: American local, state, and national courts later ruled that the 
provisions of the treaty could be superseded by local laws.”38 California’s very first state 
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constitution denied voting rights for most Mexicans, stipulating that only white Mexicans were 
entitled to suffrage.39 
Moreover, Congress’s 1851 California Land Settlement Act forced Mexicans to prove 
their land title in court. Since many had no formal titles or did not have the financial means for 
long-term litigation, they were either stripped of their property or forced to sell. The result was 
the nullification of most Mexican landholding and the transfer of property to white settlers, 
immigrant and native-born.40 Akin to the importation of Africans to the New World, such 
transfer also strengthened internal settler egalitarianism by expanding property ownership among 
whites and by providing a dependent workforce of nonwhite tenant farmers. Thus formal 
citizenship for Mexicans, just as for nonslave blacks, did not entail republican inclusion. And as 
with Indian tribes, it made them legal, political, and economic outsiders on land they had long 
possessed while at the same time providing extensive rights and opportunities to new immigrants 
with no ties to that land and only limited ties to the United States. 
In essence, slaves, Indians, free blacks, and Mexicans all persisted as subjects of a 
discretionary and imperial prerogative power, one considered inappropriate for free settlers—
immigrant or native born. This prerogative power reduced each subordinated group to the status 
of a colonized subject, whose rights were carefully correlated and stratified based on settler 
economic interests and the necessities of maintaining control. For slaves, these requirements 
entailed the denial of any meaningful protections. As for free blacks and nonwhite Mexicans, 
such groups enjoyed formal citizenship but were excluded from the political and economic 
conditions essential for republican liberty. And with respect to Indian tribes, a system of what 
might be described as ‘indirect rule’41—after analogous European imperial practices in India and 
Africa—limited federal responsibility for their welfare while ensuring that settlers possessed an 
overriding authority to claim indigenous land or to reconstruct tribal institutions if necessary. 
But the place of newly arrived Europeans in collective life, along with illustrating the 
basic structural divide between free citizens and this patchwork and stratified structure of rule 
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over dependent groups, also makes evident the essential linkages in the national experience 
between settlement and immigration. Rather than immigrant and settler serving as opposing 
categories, the settler period in American history was the heyday of both open immigration and 
extensive immigrant rights. In fact, the growth and development of settler society rested 
fundamentally on a continual supply of Europeans coming from abroad. As I will return to in 
Part Five, the move toward the restriction of white immigration—and with it modern 
immigration policies—emerged only with the closing of the frontier, transformations in 
economic production, and the larger demise of settler frameworks. Before these developments, 
republican interests in economic independence intertwined settler and immigrant identities and 
created a distinctive political community, one holding out both the promise of free citizenship 
and the specter of imperial control. 
B. Nonsettler Immigrants and the Predicament of the Chinese 
That specter was vividly illustrated by the treatment of Chinese workers in the nineteenth 
century, a new immigrant community which did not fit settler judgments about ethnic 
assimilability. Chinese immigration to the west expanded dramatically in the period following 
the California Gold Rush of 1849, with approximately 250,000 people making the trek to 
America. Of the 105,000 who resided in the country during the 1880 census, two-thirds lived in 
California and 90 percent in the ten western-most states. Chinese immigrants generally came in 
search of better wages and worked in the mines or building the transcontinental railroad. For 
many whites, they were the quintessential ‘industrial reserve army,’ a permanent body of poorly 
paid workers who were used by employers to depress white earning and to check labor activism. 
Drawing from the traditional language of ethnic membership, settlers depicted these new 
immigrants as not only damaging white economic well-being but also as inappropriate culturally 
for inclusion.42 
 This sentiment led to the emergence of a new federal immigration system for the 
Chinese, one that emphasized their ineradicable ethnic difference and incompatibility with 
American ideals of free labor and republican independence. In 1870 during Reconstruction, 
Congress finally extended the right of naturalization beyond ‘free white persons,’ but it did so 
solely for “aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent.” Although Radical 
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Republicans like Senator Charles Sumner sought to break with settler dichotomies and make 
naturalization universal, anti-Chinese sentiment was too strong. As a result, Chinese immigrants 
were explicitly barred by the bill and found themselves subject to a new legal category: ‘aliens 
ineligible for citizenship.’ In essence, the naturalization law, despite attempting to incorporate 
blacks as free citizens, embraced elements of social membership consistent with long-standing 
practices. Although European immigrants could be naturalized and were accorded extensive 
rights even before formal inclusion, this was because they were ultimately co-participants in 
settler society. By contrast, Chinese immigrants were cultural outsiders, to a degree qualitatively 
different from newly freed blacks. They were thus incapable of free citizenship and had to be 
controlled through discretionary forms of authority.43 
 Such authority was most immediately and directly expressed by Congress’s use of its 
immigration power to limit Chinese movement from abroad. The overwhelming aim of the new 
legislation was to curtail dramatically—if not eliminate—competition for white settlers from 
Chinese labor. Such power had long been understood to derive from sovereignty itself and to be 
plenary and near limitless.44 In fact, for Jacksonians like Chief Justice Roger Taney, a 
discretionary immigration power was essential to the capacity of state governments to control 
nonsettler populations, particularly free blacks and slaves, and if need be to restrict their entry 
entirely. It existed as one of the basic means by which political authorities protected the internal 
composition of settler society and policed the movement of subject groups. And for this very 
reason, European immigrants, as settler insiders, largely avoided the coercive brunt of such 
prerogatives. 
 As a result, much like other dependent communities—Indians, slaves, and free blacks—
Asian immigrants now found their freedom of movement curtailed and subject to government’s 
discretionary power. In 1875 Congress passed the Page Act, the first federal bill in American 
history restricting nonslave immigration. Although it was written in general language to bar 
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entrance of convicted criminals and prostitutes, the bill was understood by legislative drafters 
and the public at large as aimed to keep out Chinese women—who, it was argued, may 
contaminate settler society through race mixing. The effect was the maintenance of an 
overwhelmingly male Chinese population, with a male-to-female ratio of twenty-seven to one by 
1890. Congress then passed the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, prohibiting Chinese labor from 
entering the United States for ten years and declaring that no court, state or federal, “shall admit 
Chinese to citizenship.” A decade later, in the Geary Act, Congress extended this ban and made 
Chinese laborers deportable unless they had a certificate proving residence in the United States 
prior to 1892. Those without certificates would have to show good cause for failing to acquire 
one and to provide “at least one credible white witness” to establish pre-1892 habitation.45 
 Taken together these bills are often viewed as ushering in a new era of immigration 
policy, which over time would dramatically narrow the ‘golden door’ and produce a general 
system of restrictiveness. They also highlighted the historic move from state to federal control 
regarding issues of entry and removal. Chinese deportations present the very first examples in 
U.S. history of the federal government’s legal deportation of aliens, a practice that in the 
twentieth century extended far beyond Asian laborers. Therefore, historians like Roger Daniels 
argue that Chinese exclusion and deportation acts “became the hinge on which all American 
immigration policy turned.”46 But while the Chinese case would later be emulated in new modes 
of federal border control, during the Gilded Age immigration policies were still meant for 
dependent groups such as Asians, who were viewed as ethnically unfit for social membership. It 
was because the Chinese were considered to be unassimilable threats to settler identity that they 
found themselves subject to the same forms of discretionary and—indeed—imperial prerogative 
power that had long governed other dependent subjects. Thus it was perfectly compatible to 
maintain a parallel system—one that mirrored the basic colonial duality of settler life—which 
maintained a de facto open door for Europeans while imposing exclusion and forced removal on 
Chinese. 
 In other words, even as the end of slavery began to dissolve the classic boundaries of 
settler society, a commitment remained to protecting the divide between free republican citizens 
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and internally colonized groups. With respect to Chinese immigrants, this was most powerfully 
expressed in Justice John Marshall Harlan’s famed dissent from the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), which through the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ upheld the 
constitutionality of racial segregation in public accommodations. Harlan maintained that as a 
consequence of the Civil War and the Reconstruction Amendments, blacks should now be 
thought of as free republican citizens and therefore incorporated fully into the political 
community. Yet this inclusiveness did not mean the end of subject status for those who remained 
ethnically distinct and a danger to settler ideals. For Harlan, the Chinese persisted as just such an 
outsider community, “a race so different from our own that we do not permit those belonging to 
it to become citizens of the United States. Persons belonging to it are, with few exceptions, 
absolutely excluded from our country.” Harlan viewed it as a profound injustice that blacks, 
“who risked their lives for the preservation of the union,” would be barred from riding in coach 
cars while “a Chinaman can ride in the same passenger coach with white citizens of the United 
States.” In essence, he sought to maintain settler narratives of identity and membership under 
radically shifted circumstances. In classic settler terms, the problem with ‘separate but equal’ 
was that it provided subordinated outsiders (the Chinese) greater rights than it did to 
appropriately privileged insiders (newly incorporated blacks).47 
 Harlan reaffirmed his wariness of Chinese inclusion by concurring in Chief Justice 
Melville Fuller’s dissent in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark two years later. There, the Court provided a 
limited constitutional constraint on efforts aimed at restricting the rights of the Chinese 
population; it held that although Chinese immigrants may be unable to naturalize as ‘aliens 
ineligible for citizenship’ the U.S.-born children of Chinese parents enjoyed birthright 
citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment. According to the dissent, the majority opinion was 
fundamentally “injurious to the public interest,” because it served to incorporate into settler 
society “large numbers of Chinese laborers, of a distinct race and religion, [who] remain[ed] 
strangers in the land, . . . unfamiliar with our institutions, and apparently incapable of 
assimilating with our people.”48 Moreover, the dissent buttressed these arguments with 
depictions of China as a threatening empire, depictions that had been prevalent among politicians 
and laborers even during the earliest days of Chinese immigration. Such accounts presented 
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China as seeking to use an endless supply of workers to expand culturally and politically into the 
U.S. As Fuller and Harlan argued, “subjects of the emperor of China . . . [remained] bound to 
him by every conception of duty and by every principle of their religion” such that even those 
born in the U.S. were still “pilgrims and sojourners as all their fathers were.” In their view, only 
by asserting discretionary power over new immigrants would the danger imposed by imperial 
China be surmounted and republican institutions survive.49   
In both Plessy and Wong Kim Ark, Harlan’s concerns about the relative treatment of 
blacks and Chinese and about Asian inclusion, respectively, were considered irrelevant by the 
Court’s majority. This was precisely because neither emancipated blacks nor U.S. born Chinese 
had been elevated by the Court to the status of free settlers. In both instances, formal citizenship 
was seen as perfectly compatible with structures of subordination, as highlighted by the idea of 
‘separate but equal.’ Moreover, the very precondition for providing small numbers of Chinese 
with birthright citizenship had been exclusion laws that overwhelmingly curtailed the growth of 
the Asian population and protected white settlers from both economic competition and the ethnic 
threat posed by a large non-white immigrant community. Moreover, for the Wong Kim Ark Court 
the central benefit of birthright citizenship had little to do with the Chinese community, and 
rather concerned how it facilitated the swift inclusion of European immigrants. As Gray’s 
majority opinion argued, the problem with rejecting the principle was that Congress could in the 
future deny nationality “to thousands of persons of English, Scotch, Irish, German, or other 
European parentage who have always been considered and treated as citizens of the United 
States.”50  If anything, the treatment of Chinese in the late nineteenth century—even when 
granted birthright citizenship—emphasized how legal and political decision-makers in the U.S. 
developed differential migration policies so as both to facilitate settler growth and to maintain an 
ethnically-defined internal community.  
   
V. Settler Decline and the Transformation in Immigrant Standing 
If essentially free European immigration was at the center of nineteenth century 
American practices regarding social membership and territorial expansion, when did these 
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policies collapse and why are they so removed from the contemporary approach? In effect, by 
the first two decades of the twentieth century all the basic elements of settler life faced profound 
strain—highlighted by the closing of the frontier as well as dramatic shifts in the economy that 
greatly expanded industrial and wage labor. Certainly settlerism as an organizing constitutional 
system disintegrated slowly and in stages, and in a profound sense continued to animate political 
life well after an ongoing project of actual ‘settlement’ had largely disappeared. Therefore it 
would be difficult to pinpoint a single moment that marked its final end. But the clearest legal 
and political means by which one could perceive the demise of the old framework was in the 
treatment of European immigrants, the historic engine of conquest and territorial expansion.  
With the frontier project principally over, the place for white immigrants in collective life 
became increasingly uncertain. Without a demographic need to populate new territories and 
given heightened industrialization and factory production, more and more European immigrants 
were viewed as economic threats to native-born Americans rather than co-participants in a 
shared political enterprise. In this context, the national commitment to de facto open borders 
waned. Thus the first sign of a retreating settler politics was the gradual elimination of alien 
suffrage laws, which had promoted immigration and fostered the quick inclusion of Europeans as 
free republican citizens. In the final years of the nineteenth century, states overwhelming rejected 
new proposals to enfranchise foreigners, with the last such proposal going down in defeat in 
Massachusetts’s 1917 constitutional convention. Even more strikingly, the Idaho territory in 
1874 became the first state or territory during the era to repeal its declarant alien voting law. 
These efforts snowballed in the initial decades of the twentieth century, after McKinley’s 
assassination in 1901 by Leon Czolgosz (an American-born citizen with a ‘foreign’ sounding 
name) and concerns during World War I with national loyalty. In 1926 Arkansas, the last state in 
the union to allow noncitizen voting, repealed its alien suffrage law.51 As a result, the United 
States had begun to approximate Coke’s old approach to the relationship between aliens and 
sovereign subjects. Rather than being co-participants, white foreigners—at least prior to 
naturalization—were outsiders properly governed through a legal regime distinct from that for 
full members. 
 This increasing American conformity to the European model was further brought home in 
immigration border policy, which emphasized the federal government’s near absolute power 
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over the entrance and movement of all noncitizens, regardless of race. In Oceanic Steam 
Navigation Co. v. Stranahan (1909), involving a federal statute that authorized officials to 
prevent the entry of individuals carrying contagious diseases, the Supreme Court went well 
beyond the specific facts of the case. In matters of immigrant entrance, the justices rejected as a 
general matter a meaningful role for judicial review of congressional action. As Justice Edward 
White declared in his opinion for the Court, “over no conceivable subject is the legislative power 
of Congress more complete than it is over . . . the right to bring aliens into the United States.” In 
fact, according to White this power “embrace[ed] every conceivable aspect of that subject” and 
suggested the legitimacy of wide-ranging controls vis-à-vis noncitizen aliens.52 In the past, 
Chinese exclusion had been premised on their inherent unfitness for republican citizenship and 
had gone hand in hand with the persistence of an open door for white immigrants as well as the 
avoidance of exercising such plenary authority over them. However, by 1917, with the premise 
of territorial expansion gone, the public increasingly came to view all new immigrants, 
irrespective of ethnicity, as labor competition. That year the U.S. government finally established 
a literacy test for new arrivals which supporters hoped would limit entrance especially by 
southern and eastern Europeans.53 
 In 1921 Congress then passed its first numerical quotas, restricting annual immigration 
from each country to 3 percent of “the number of foreign-born persons of such nationality 
resident in the United States as determined by the United States census of 1910.” Three years 
later Congress passed the National Origins Act, further limiting entrance to 2 percent of the 
numbers already residing in the United States according to the 1890 census. The law’s central 
purpose and effect was to purify ethnically the population of new immigrants by reducing the 
quota for southern and eastern Europeans. The law also explicitly excluded from the quota 
system Asian immigrants—“aliens ineligible to citizenship and their descendents” and blacks—
“the descendents of slave immigrants.” As a result, it boosted the share of entrants from northern 
and western Europe to 84 percent and essentially ended the legal immigration of many nonwhite 
groups.54 
 The racially discriminatory elements of the 1924 National Origins Act, which have been 
discussed at length by historians, certainly helped to perpetuate the idea of whiteness as essential 
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to full American inclusion.55 Yet taken together the two quota provisions carried with them 
another key implication. Even if American inclusion would continue to be defined in racial 
terms, the limitation and control of European migrants suggested that such racial hierarchies 
were embedded in a very different institutional framework. In effect, all immigrants were now 
subject to the discretionary and prerogative power of the federal government. Europeans too, 
while at the top of this stratified hierarchy, found their free movement curtailed and their 
presence in the United States managed by an increasingly intrusive state authority. In asserting 
the legitimacy of prerogative rights over European aliens, such restrictions organized previous 
settler insiders under the same rubric of control that applied toward Indians, blacks, Chinese, and 
Mexicans. 
 This rubric was most evident in the extension of a post-entry deportation system for all 
immigrants, which emerged during the 1920s. As Daniel Kanstroom writes:  
Deportation of “aliens” without proper documents became a major component of an 
increasingly large, bureaucratized deportation system. The total number of deportees 
rose from 2,762 in 1920 to 38,796 in 1929. From 1921 to 1930, of the more than 
92,000 people deported, more than 36,000 were found to have entered without 
proper documents, without inspection, or by fraud.56  
In fact, this broad-based use of prerogative powers to remove large numbers of migrants created 
a new category of ‘illegal aliens.’ Again, the idea of who counted as illegal was clearly racialized 
in American politics, focusing particularly on Mexican laborers recruited to work in the fields of 
the Southwest.57 But even with the racial nature of deportation efforts, these policies made 
apparent that all immigrants were under a plenary regime. Like previous subject populations, 
recent arrivals from Europe found not only their right to vote denied but their life before 
naturalization supervised by state authorities with powers of exclusion and removal. Taken as a 
whole, government efforts—marked by the end of alien voting, quota restrictions, and 
deportation procedures—highlighted a remarkable break with practices that had been pervasive 
since the seventeenth century. They emphasized the profound alteration in the status and role of 
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immigrants in collective and laid the groundwork for our current system, one built on rigid 
boundaries between the rights afforded citizens and noncitizens. 
  
VI. Conclusion: Immigration Today as the Return of the ‘Periphery’ 
What does this historical narrative suggest about the contemporary predicament of 
immigrants and their place in American economic and political life? To begin with, today’s 
migration flows are at root the product of sharp divergences in opportunity between those in the 
global north and the global south. Within this international framework, the United States enjoys 
tremendous and perhaps historically unparalleled economic, military, and political power. And 
despite fears of decline, by virtually any barometer America’s position as sole global superpower 
remains firm. Its output amounts to 20 percent of the world’s total and nearly doubles that of 
China, the next closest country.58 In terms of sheer military might, the United States accounts for 
almost half of global defense expenditures, a number equal to the following twenty nations 
combined.59 Given this global standing, it is hardly surprising that the country continues to 
attract migrants from abroad seeking to improve their social and economic position. It is also not 
surprising that the overwhelming majority of current immigrant communities are originally from 
regions in the global south (parts of Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, and Central and South 
America)—precisely those regions that face the brunt of vast disparities in international wealth 
and practical power. Above all, this means that migration to the United States should not be 
viewed as simply an arbitrary occurrence; it is a product of both international structures of 
inequality and U.S. status within the global order as ‘the first among equals.’  
Thus a remarkable feature of today’s immigration is the manner in which it reverses the 
classic settler paradigm. Recall that throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
European immigrants were by and large viewed as co-participants in an ethnically defined 
project of expansion, one that secured for white settlers the precondition of republican 
freedom—economic independence through land ownership. As such, white noncitizens were 
often immediately included as social equals, with the federal government granting them access to 
property out west and with many states providing them with voting rights. This inclusion in the 
shared settler enterprise meant that immigrants during the high tide of territorial conquest were 
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treated as worthy of free labor and free citizenship, while other subordinated communities (most 
obviously African slaves) were consigned to degraded forms of work. 
 Now in place of European co-ethnics, immigrants to the United States are 
overwhelmingly nonwhite, the very individuals that settlers once deemed ‘unfit’ for full 
membership. And instead of extending settler projects into the frontier or ‘periphery’ as 
nineteenth-century immigrants did, today’s new arrivals in essence represent the movement of 
this periphery into the very center of metropolitan power. To a large extent, this movement was 
made possible by the elimination in 1965, during the height of the civil rights movement, of 
national origins quotas. But while such policy shifts challenged the country’s racial identity, 
present-day immigrants have not enjoyed anything approaching the swift and full inclusion of 
their predecessors. By contrast, they often find themselves playing a similar economic function 
to classic subordinated groups. As the cheap labor at the bottom rung of the American economy, 
immigration perpetuates new stratifications that distinguish between those engaged in high-status 
work and those confined to low-skill employment.60 Moreover, confronted by extensive social 
disabilities and facing the constant possibility of detention and forced removal, these 
immigrants’ status at the edges of collective life replicates not only the economic function but 
also the very political dependence that historically linked excluded communities to settler 
society. 
 Nothing better underscores the emergence of these dynamics than the symbiotic 
relationship between the United States and Mexico. Over the last century, the American 
government has repeatedly employed its immigration powers to provide business interests with a 
permanent supply of inexpensive Mexican labor that could be terminated whenever employers 
saw fit or deported during periods of economic downturn. The most famous of these efforts was 
the Bracero Program, which between the 1940s and the 1960s brought 200,000 temporary 
workers annually as agricultural laborers into the U.S. Southwest. The program helped entrench 
the social and family networks between the two countries that today sustain the flow of new 
migrants north. It also went hand in hand with mass deportation of Mexican laborers when 
employers no longer needed the workforce. Earlier, during the Great Depression, such 
deportation took the form of a large-scale ‘repatriation’ campaign that sent over 400,000 people, 
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including many formal American citizens, back to Mexico. And at the height of the Bracero 
Program, ‘Operation Wetback’ in 1954 apprehended 170,000 undocumented workers over the 
course of three months and forcibly removed them by bus, train, and boat.61 
 Today there are more immigrants from Mexico than from any other country in the world, 
including over 100,000 lawful permanent residents who entered every year between 1988 and 
1998. Alongside this population are over 6.5 million undocumented Mexican laborers, many of 
whom have worked in the United States for decades.62 Although these numbers are the direct 
product of a long-standing symbiotic tie between the two countries, Mexican immigrants find 
themselves on the receiving end of strict border enforcement efforts and deportation schemes. 
This treatment ignores the role played by express government programs, as well as tacit state 
support for corporate employers, in creating and sustaining the Mexican community in the 
United States. 
 Such migration patterns are also illustrative of a deeper fact about contemporary 
American economic life, hinted at above. At present, those from the global south, particularly the 
11 million undocumented immigrants,63 often provide the labor that settlers long viewed as 
inconsistent with self-rule—from women engaged in domestic service for professional elites to 
unskilled factory employees in what remains of the manufacturing sector. Alongside poor white 
and minority citizens, immigrant non-nationals today, in ever-expanding numbers, play the part 
of softening the intensity of the division of labor between high and low status work. Indeed, 
many middle-class Americans have avoided finding themselves on the wrong side of the 
productive divide precisely because of immigrant workers.  
In the case of household activities, women in professional and managerial jobs 
increasingly maintain their positions by relying on a domestic service industry often, although by 
no means solely, staffed by transnational women from the global south. Rather than having 
household labor equally shared by all and therefore losing its gendered status, such labor is 
carried out in a way that still casts it almost exclusively as women’s work while reinforcing the 
separation between privileged and dependent forms of employment. At a broader level, instead 
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of challenging the productive divide—one that distinguishes elevated from degraded labor—
contemporary arrangements have allowed this divide to grow ever more extreme. In a sense, the 
end of settlerism has not meant the end of using subordinated groups to engage in the most 
menial and unfree practices. Thus although explicit settler frameworks may have receded, old 
structures of economic hierarchy continue in mutated form, with insider privilege sustaining 
outsider exclusion. As in the past, a central mechanism for preserving these hierarchies is the old 
discretionary prerogative. As highlighted in the introduction, this prerogative is evident in the 
1996 congressional reforms as well as in the rise of a massive detention apparatus for 
noncitizens, one unleashed on the documented and undocumented alike. 
In a sense, immigrants have gone from being the engine of settler expansion and thus 
worthy of full incorporation to one key and identifiable component of the dependent labor at the 
base of collective life—labor that both embodies and perpetuates conditions of inequality and 
privilege. In the past, the settler approach to European immigration, which viewed such groups 
as presumptive citizens, embodied both the best and worst of settler ideals. On the one hand, 
such openness rested on maintaining the exclusion of those culturally unfit for membership and 
thus sustaining and reproducing relationships of subordination. On the other hand, it nonetheless 
meant seeing a rich account of free citizenship as bound to the full incorporation of outsiders. At 
present, reversing current immigration practices should begin by reviving and, more importantly, 
universalizing the settler approach. Such a politics would entail employing the logic of inclusion 
to see the emancipatory potential of the American experience as relevant for the present, but 
crucially as bound neither to the subordinated labor of outsiders nor to projects of expansion. 
Over time, such efforts may finally begin to fulfill the real exceptionalism of the American 
project: a commitment to stripping republican ideals of their oppressive roots and to making free 
citizenship broadly accessible to all.    
 
 
